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Abstract The aim of this study is to clarify the meaning of the term saṁketa,
which is usually translated as ‘(linguistic) convention’, in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the
first and the most authoritative commentary to the Yogasūtras. This paper is a
contribution to the reconstruction of the classical Yoga view on the relation between
word and its meaning, for saṁketa is a key term used by this darśana in discussing
this relation. The textual analysis of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya has led me to the con-
clusion that its author’s understanding of the linguistic convention (saṁketa) is
different from the notion of the linguistic convention (saṁketa/samaya) of the
Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas and similar to the notion of the linguistic convention
(samaya/saṁketa) of the Grammarians (as presented in Houben’s article “Bhartr
˙
-
hari’s samaya/Hela¯ra¯ja’s saṁketa. A contribution to the reconstruction of the
Grammarian’s discussion with the Vais´es
˙
ikas on the relation between śabda and
artha”, published in the “Journal of Indian Philosophy”). These are interpretations
of the term saṁketa which reflect Yogasūtrabhāṣya’s understanding of the linguistic
convention: the tradition of the usage of words, established (practice/custom of the)
usage of words. Saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, unlike saṁketa/samaya of the
Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, is not an agreement established by anyone, but an
agreement in the sense of tradition, established practice, or established custom.
Unlike the saṁketa/samaya of these philosophers, the saṁketa of the Yo-
gasūtrabhāṣya, having neither beginning nor end, is not re-created (re-established),
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On the Notion of Linguistic Convention (saṁketa)
in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya
A key term used in classical Yoga1 in the discussion of the relation between word
(śabda) and its meaning (artha) is saṁketa, which is usually translated as ‘(linguistic)
convention’. In the textual tradition of Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga this term appears first in the
1 By ‘classical Yoga’ I understand that form of Yoga which was codified in the Yogasūtras (YS) and in
the Yogasūtrabhāṣya (YBh), the first and the most authoritative and widely known commentary to the YS
(see footnote 2 on the authorship and date of the YS and YBh). In this article I shall use the terms
‘classical Yoga’ and ‘Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga’ synonymously. There is no consensus among the scholars as to the
texts belonging to the classical Yoga tradition. In my opinion, this question is still open, and its
clarification depends first of all on the careful study of the extant commentaries to the YS and YBh, which
is not possible without complete and reliable critical editions of these commentaries (the situation of the
lack of such editions of the classical Yoga texts is described by Maas (2013, pp. 78–81); it looks like
nowadays there are only two critical editions which are based on all available important manuscripts and
possess satisfactory scholarly apparatus: the critical edition of the first chapter of the YS and YBh
prepared by Maas and the unpublished critical edition of the first chapter of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra-
vivaraṇa prepared by Harimoto (the shortcomings of the 1952 complete edition of this text are described
in Haromoto 2014, pp. 15–16); as we see, each of these editions embraces only the first part of the
respective text).
Larson says that the YS, YBh, and Tattvavaiśāradī (ca. 950–1000 CE according to Acharya (2014,
p. XXVIII); ca. 850–950 CE according to Larson (Larson and Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 9, 54)) of Va¯caspati
Mis´ra “taken together provide the core textual evidence for Pa¯tan˜jalayogas´a¯stra”, calling these three texts
its “core textual complex” (2011, pp. 65, 71). As to the Tattvavaiśāradī, it is a detailed, profound, and
original commentary to the YS and YBh (according to the second opening śloka of the Tattvavaiśāradī, it
is a commentary to the YBh). Its author Va¯caspati Mis´ra, though not himself a follower of Yoga, in his
Tattvavaiśāradī is faithful to the thought of the texts he comments upon. This feature distinguishes the
Tattvavaiśāradī from many other commentaries and subcommentaries to the YS, for example from the





u interprets Yoga as an integral part of his bheda-abheda Veda¯nta, and for this
reason I do not include his Yogavārttika into the textual tradition of Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga.
It is very probable that one more text, namely the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, must be added to this
“core textual complex” of Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga (see footnote 3 on the authorship and date of this commentary).
The Veda¯ntic inclination of the author of this commentary on the YS and YBh is obvious, especially
when he explains the passages about I¯s´vara (for the detailed account of the Veda¯ntic influence in the
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa see Leggett’s (1992) introduction to his English translation of this text). On
the other hand, it looks like in this commentary in most cases the foundations and main premises of the
Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga system remain intact. I tend to agree with Rukmani that “the Vivaran
˙
aka¯ra is indeed
advocating the ontological position of the Yoga system without any advaitic comments” (1992, p. 422).
I think that the most important criterion for treating a commentary or a subcommenatry to the YS as a
classical Yoga text is its faithfulness to the thought of Yoga of the YS and the YBh, the preservation of
the main distinctive features and ontological, epistemological, and soteriological grounds of the system
presented in these texts (for example, I shall not treat as a classical Yoga text a commentary that
undercuts the dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa). If we rely upon this criterion only, we certainly include in
the textual tradition of classical Yoga the Rājamārtaṇḍa (ca. 1050 CE according to Larson (Larson and
Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 9, 54)), the commentary on the YS by Bhoja Deva. The main question which
remains open for me is if this criterion is sufficient for treating this or that commentary to the YS or the




Yogasūtrabhāṣya2 (YBh). We encounter it also in many later commentaries to the
Yogasūtras (YS) and YBh, such as Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa,3Tattvavaiśāradī,
2 Before the critical edition of the first chapter of the YS and YBh prepared by Maas and the series of his
publications in which Maas inquired into the question of the authorship of these texts (2006, pp. XII–XIX,
2008, pp. 112–113, 2013, pp. 57–69) it had been generally accepted by scholars that one person, called
Patan˜jali (there was no definite answer to the questionwhether it was the real name of the compiler of the YS
or the name ascribed to him by tradition (see Larson andBhattacharya 1987, pp. 165–166)), compiled theYS
and somebody else, called by tradition Vya¯sa or Vedavya¯sa, composed the YBh. In his publications Maas
calls into question this widespread view. He bases his arguments on the analysis of the 25 manuscripts he
used for his critical edition of the first chapter of the YS and YBh, as well as on the external evidence. Maas
says that numerous medieval sources (“dating from the tenth century onwards” (2006, pp. XIV–XV,, 2013,
p. 57); see also Larson’s “Introduction to the philosophy of Yoga” in Larson and Bhattacharya 2011, p. 40)
“support the hypothesis that a single person called Patan˜jali collected some sūtras, probably from different,
now lost sources, composedmost of the sūtras himself and provided thewhole set with his own explanations
in a work with the title Pātañjala Yogaśāstra” (2013, pp. 65–66). Maas argues that his hypothesis that the
“Pātañjala Yogaśāstra is a singleworkwith a single author” is also supported by the chapter colophons of all
the 25 manuscripts of the YS and YBh the scholar used for his critical edition (2013, p. 58; 2006, pp. XV–
XVII), by the fact that in nearly allmanuscripts the YS appears togetherwith theYBh (2013, pp. 58–62), and
by the wording of some passages of these texts which indicate that they “were composed as a unifiedwhole”
(2013, pp. 63–65; 2006, pp. XVI–XVII). Maas considers the attribution of the YBh to Vya¯sa to be of a late
origin. According toMaas, the oldest unambiguous evidence of a separate authorship of Patan˜jali andVya¯sa
appears in Ma¯dhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha composed in the XIV century (2006, pp. XIII–XV, XVII,
2013, pp. 67–69). Defending his view on the origin and authorship of the YS and YBh, Maas develops
argumentation introduced by Bronkhorst. We can find many important arguments presented by Maas in the
publications ofBronkhorst (1985a, pp. 170–171, 179, 1985b, 1991, pp. 212–213).Bronkhorst formulates his
hypothesis as follows: “The above observations have made it plausible that the author of the Yogabhāṣya
brought the Yoga su¯tras together, perhaps from different sources, and wrote a commentary which in some
cases demonstrably deviated from the original intention of the su¯tras” (1985b, p. 203). According to
Bronkhorst, the personwho brought together the sūtras known as theYS andwrote the commentary on them
known as the YBh was probably either Sa¯m˙khya teacher Vindhyava¯sin or Sa¯m˙khya teacher Patan˜jali
(1985b, pp. 203–209).
The hypothesis of Bronkhorst–Maas that the collection of sūtras known to us as the YS had not existed
before the author of the YBh compiled the sūtras, is well-grounded and worth special attention. However,
further research is needed in order to explain some facts that can question this hypothesis. Among these
facts are: Bhoja Deva in his Rājamārtaṇḍa comments on the YS only, which suggests that he treats the
YS as a separate text, independent of the YBh; the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa uses the
word ‘sūtrakāra’ for the author of the sūtras and the word ‘bhāṣyakāra’ for the author of the bhāṣya he
comments upon (see Harimoto 2014, p. 7, footnote 1); as was noticed by Bronkhorst, the views attributed
in the Sa¯m˙khya commentary Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600–700 CE according to Larson and Bhattacharya (1987,
pp. 16, 20, 227–228)) to Patan˜jali agree with the views of the YS and do not agree with the views of the
YBh, and the views attributed in the Yuktidīpikā to Vindhyava¯sin agree with the views of the YBh and do
not agree with the views of the YS (see Bronkhorst 1985b, pp. 206–208; see also Maas 2013, p. 65). The
dates of the YS and YBh according to Larson: ca. 350–400 CE (Larson and Bhattacharya, pp. 9, 53, 161).
Maas dates “the Pa¯tan˜jala Yogas´a¯stra”, by which he understands these two texts as “a unified whole”, to
the period of 325 to 425 CE (2013, p. 66).
3 Harimoto, who dealt with the manuscripts of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, writes that the
colophons of the manuscripts ascribe this commentary to S´am˙kara Bhagavatpa¯da (2014, p. 8). For many
decades, the commentary has been a subject of vivid polemics among scholars, who discussed its date,
authorship (first of all the question whether it was composed by great Advaitin S´am˙kara or not), and
significance for the history of the Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga philosophy and Indian philosophy in general. The
overview of the opinions of the scholars who dealt with the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa can be found,
for example, in Maas (2013, pp. 73–78), Larson and Bhattacharya (2011, pp. 239–240), and Harimoto
(2014, pp. 225–251). Rukmani, the author of the newest English translation of the whole of the
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa and of a series of articles about this commentary, rejected the view
ascribing it to the great Advaitin S´am˙kara, and tried to prove the later date of the commentary; one of the
main arguments of Rukmani lay in that the Vivaraṇa contained references to the Tattvavaiśāradī of
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Rājamārtaṇḍa, Yogavārttika. The aim of this article is to clarify the meaning of the
term saṁketa in the YBh, the first and the most authoritative commentary to the YS.
In Brahmanical philosophy saṁketa is one of the main terms of the linguistic
theory of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, which held that the relation between word
and its meaning, primarily unrelated, was established by convention (samaya4/
saṁketa). According to these philosophers, the relation between word and its
meaning, primarily unrelated, was created by some person/persons and communi-
cated to other persons who accepted (agreed with) this relation (Vaiśeṣikasūtras1 II,
1, 18–19 and VII, 2, 15–24, corresponding to Vaiśeṣikasūtras2 II, 1, 18–19 and VII,
2, 14–20; Nyāyasūtras II, 1, 53–56 and Nyāyabhāṣya II, 1, 52–56). In the later
Nya¯ya and Vais´es
˙
ika texts the author of the primary linguistic convention is
omniscient I¯s´vara, which creates (in fact, re-creates) words and their relation with
their meanings in accordance with his will at the beginning of each new cycle of
existence of the world (see, for example, Candra¯nanda’s Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti II, 1,
18–19; Va¯caspati Mis´ra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā II, 1, 52–56; S´an˙kara Mis´ra’s
Upaskāra VII, 2, 20 and II, 1, 18–19).5
Feuerstein observes rightly: “The philosophical notion of the eternal relationship
between word and objective referent … is an integral part of the metaphysics of
Classical Yoga” (1996, pp. 392–393), pointing out in this manner the importance of
a careful study of the classical Yoga view on word, meaning, and the relationship
between them for our understanding of the classical Yoga philosophy in general. It
looks like not much has been done in the area of study of the classical Yoga
philosophy of language, which remains one of the most abstruse and unexplored
parts of the classical Yoga philosophy. This paper is a contribution to the
Footnote 3 continued
Va¯caspati Mis´ra (see Rukmani 1992, 1993, 1998; “Introduction” in Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (2), vol.
1, pp. IX–XXXI; “Introduction”, “Appendix I”, and “Appendix II” in Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (2),
vol. 2, pp. IX–X, 212–222). Rukmani concludes that the author of the Vivaraṇa “lived after the twelfth
century of the Common Era” and “could not have lived later than the fifteenth century of the Common
Era” (“Introduction” in Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (2), vol. 2, p. IX). The later date of the
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, namely ca. 1050–1350, was accepted in the volume on Yoga of “Ency-
clopedia of Indian Philosophies” (Larson and Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 9, 239–240). However, Harimoto
undermined most of Rukmani’s arguments, including her central argument that the author of the
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa knew the Tattvavaiśāradī of Va¯caspati Mis´ra and referred to it (see Hari-
moto 2004, 2014, pp. 230–241). Harimoto, as well as Maas (2013, p. 75) and some other scholars, for
example Bronkhorst (1985b, p. 203) and Wezler (1983, pp. 27–34), consider Pātañjalayogaśāstravi-
varaṇa to be the earliest known commentary to the YS and YBh. Maas makes the version of the YS and
YBh contained in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa the basis of his critical edition of the first chapter of
the YS and YBh (2008, p. 98). It is necessary to mention that Larson is quite skeptical about Maas’s view
that the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, which belongs to the southern tradition of transmission, contains
more original readings than the northern line of tradition, called by Maas ‘the Vulgate’, transmitted by
most of the printed editions, and about Maas’s favoring “the Vivaraṇa readings over the Vulgate read-
ings” (see Larson 2009, pp. 495–497).
4 In the YS and YBh the word samaya does not appear in the role of the term of the philosophy of
language.
5 On the nature of the relation between word and its meaning in Vais´es
˙
ika and Nya¯ya see, for example:
Dash (1991), Ganeri (1999, pp. 31–40), Potter (1977, p. 153), Potter and Bhattacharyya (2011, pp. 151–
153) and Raja (1969, pp. 21–23).
4 O. Łucyszyna
123
reconstruction of the classical Yoga view on the relation between word and its
meaning, for clarification of the term saṁketa is of vital importance for the
understanding of this view. My research is inspired by Houben’s article
“Bhartr
˙
hari’s samaya/Hela¯ra¯ja’s saṁketa. A contribution to the reconstruction of
the Grammarian’s discussion with the Vais´es
˙
ikas on the relation between śabda and
artha” (1992), in which the scholar clarifies the sense of the terms samaya and
saṁketa in the philosophy of the Grammarians. It is necessary to emphasize the
preliminary character of the results of my research. It is possible that they will be
made more precise by future studies devoted to the philosophy of language of
classical Yoga, first of all by the reconstruction of the view on word and meaning of
the YS, YBh, and Tattvavaiśāradī.6
It seems like there is no separate research devoted to the notion of saṁketa or to
the relation between word and its meaning in classical Yoga. The scholars present
different opinions concerning the notion of saṁketa in the YBh. Which of these
opinions is true? Chakravarti (1933, pp. 349–350, 358–359) holds that the
conception of the relation between word and its meaning and the notion of saṁketa
of the YBh are similar to those of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas; he says also that
the YS and YBh object to Bhartr
˙
hari’s conception of the relation between word and
its meaning and his understanding of samaya/saṁketa (1933, pp. 358–360).
Chakravarti writes about the linguistic conception presented in YBh I, 27 (see below
my translation and analysis of this passage of the YBh): “A word naturally
expresses that sense alone which was assigned to it by the divine volition. This
6 In this article I do not touch upon the questions of how word (śabda) and meaning (artha) are
understood in the classical Yoga texts. I assume preliminarily that in Yoga, as in other Brahmanical
darśanas, in those contexts in which philosophers speak about meaning directly, meaning is understood
as a referent, that is, a thing of the existent world to which word refers (and not a notion or something that
exists in our thought only). In the YS, YBh, Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, and Tattvavaiśāradī I could not
find passages in which the Yoga conception of meaning is presented directly. In YS III, 17 it is said about
erroneous identification of śabda (‘word’), artha (‘meaning’), and pratyaya (‘concept’, ‘notion’, ‘idea’),
which are to be distinguished from one another. It follows from this that meaning of a word is clearly
distinguished from a mental idea produced by it. What is this meaning (referent) of a word: the individual,
the universal, or both? Commenting on YS III, 17, the author of the YBh, Va¯caspati Mis´ra, and Bhoja
Deva give as an example of ‘meaning’ (artha) a real empirical cow, possessing a dewlap and other
attributes of a cow (see the YBh, Tattvavaiśāradī, and Rājamārtaṇḍa), and this can be interpreted as a
suggestion that meaning is understood as the individual. In the final passage of his commentary to YS III,
17 the author of the YBh says that the real changeable object is the support (ālambanībhūta) of both word
and mental idea, from which also it can follow that he understands meaning as the individual. But in the
commentary to YS I, 49 he holds that word has the relation with the universal, and not with the individual
(see below my analysis of the meaning of the word saṁketa in YBh I, 49); the same is clearly stated in the
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa and Tattvavaiśāradī I, 49. Bhoja Deva, commenting upon YS III, 17,
explains artha as jāti-guṇa-kriyā-ādi (‘the universal, the quality, action, etc.’), and commenting on YS I,
42, he explains artha as jāty-ādi (‘the universal, etc.’). It follows from this that according to Bhoja Deva
word denotes the universal or both the universal and the individual. My hypothesis is that according to
Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga word means the universal directly (for the relation between word and meaning is
permanent (see below my analysis of YBh I, 27), and the permanent character of this relation requires the
permanent character of meaning) and the individual indirectly. I do not claim that in all contexts a
referent is understood by ‘meaning’ (artha). I assume that in some contexts Yoga philosophers, as well as
philosophers of other Brahmanical darśanas, by meaning understand sense. Such understanding of
meaning can occur in the contexts where they do not define meaning directly. For more detailed (though
preliminary) remarks about the meaning of ‘meaning’ (artha) in Yoga and other Brahmanical darśanas
see Łucyszyna (2014). The issue of word and meaning in classical Yoga requires a separate careful study.
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saṅketa or the Will of God (samaya) is the connection that exists between a word
and the object that is symbolized by it” (1933, pp. 349–350).
Coward’s opinion in his book “The sphoṭa theory of language” is rather
ambiguous. On the one hand, he says (1997, p. 34) about the YBh’s view on the
relation between word and its meaning presented in the commentary to YS I, 27: “The
conventional activity of I¯s´vara is only for the purpose of manifesting this meaning
which is already inherently existing.” On the other hand, after citing the passage of
Va¯caspati Mis´ra’s commentary on YBh I, 27, he says (1997, p. 34): “According to the
Yoga School I¯s´vara or God repeatedly recreates this same convention in each new
creation ….” It follows from the first citation that I¯s´vara does not create, but only
manifests the relation between words and their meanings, and from the second
citation it follows that I¯s´vara creates this relation—in accordance with the relation of
the previous cycles of existence of the world. In the second citation I¯s´vara seems to
act as an author of the primary linguistic convention—as in Nya¯ya and Vais´es
˙
ika. It
looks like in his second statement Coward treats the view of the Tattvavaiśāradī as the
view of Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga in general (wherein I, however, do not agree with him). In his
later book “Yoga and psychology”, devoted to Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga, Coward’s opinion is
devoid of the above ambiguity. Characterizing the YBh’s view on the relation
between word andmeaning presented in YBh I, 27, Coward (2002, p. 17) writes: “The
conventional usage of words serves only to reveal the fixed relations and meanings
that have permanently existed.” Coward’s opinion here is opposite to the opinion of
Chakravarti, and I agree with Coward.
The main passage for our analysis is the YBh commentary on YS I, 27. The sūtra
is: tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ // (“The [word] expressing (vācaka) Him is praṇava [i.
e., the sacred syllable oṁ].”) This sūtra is a part of the context in which Patan˜jali
introduces his idea of I¯s´vara and recommends the repetitive recitation (japa) of the
syllable oṁ and contemplation (bhāvana) upon its meaning (artha), that is, I¯s´vara
(sūtras I, 23–29). The YBh commentary to this sūtra contains the question about the
nature of the relation between word and its meaning and the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s answer
on it. I shall cite this commentary in full:
The [object] expressed (vācya) [by praṇava, i.e., the sacred syllable oṁ] is
I¯s´vara.
– Is its being the [word] expressing [this object] (vācakatva) established by
convention (saṁketa-kṛta) or permanent (sthita), as [the relation] between the
lamp and light?
– The relation of this [object] expressed [by the word] (vācya) to the [word]
expressing [it] (vācaka) is permanent (sthita). However (tu), convention
(saṁketa) illuminates (jvalayati) that very (eva) meaning (artha)7—as the
7 The reading of most manuscripts transmitting the Vulgate is (see the critical edition prepared by Maas,
p. 43):
saṁketas tv īśvarasya sthitam evārtham abhinayati /
However (tu), the convention (saṁketa) of I¯s´vara reveals (abhinayati) the meaning (artha) [which
is] permanent (sthita) indeed (eva).
This sentence of the Vulgate is ambiguous. It can also be translated as follows:
6 O. Łucyszyna
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relation between father and son [which is] permanent (sthita) is made known
(dyotyate) by convention (saṁketa): “This is his father”, “This is his son”. In
other cycles of existence of the world (sarga),8 too, exactly the same convention
(saṁketa) is assumed (kriyate), dependent on the denotative power (śakti) of the
expressing [word] (vācaka) in respect of the [object] expressed [by it] (vācya).9
The scriptural authorities (āgamin) state that the relation between word (śabda)
and [its] meaning (artha) is eternal (nitya) because of the eternal character
(nityatā) of consensus (saṁpratipatti) [of the users of language].10
It is clear from this passage that the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s understanding of the term saṁketa
does not coincide with its understanding in the philosophy of language of the
Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas. It is only in the opponent’s question in the very
beginning of the cited passage the term saṁketa has the same sense as in the
philosophy of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, that is, it means convention as a
creation by some person/persons of the relation between word and meaning,
unrelated before this act, and communication of this relation to other persons
accepting it. The Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s saṁketa is not the same as saṁketa about which the
opponent asks him. The opponent asks whether the relation between word and its
meaning is ‘established by convention’ (saṁketa-kṛta) or permanent (sthita). For the
author of the YBh, as well as for the opponent, ‘convention’ (saṁketa) is the key
term of the conception of relation between word and its meaning, but for the
Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra the act of establishing convention (agreement, consensus) concerning
word meanings never took place. For the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra, unlike for the opponent,
convention (agreement, consensus) concerning the relation between word and its
meaning and the permanence of this relation are not alternative (mutually
exclusive). The Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra says that according to the ‘scriptural authorities’
(āgamin) the relation between word and meaning is eternal (nitya), because
Footnote 7 continued
However (tu), the convention (saṁketa) concerning [the word denoting] I¯s´vara reveals
(abhinayati) the meaning (artha) [which is] permanent (sthita) indeed (eva).
8 Sarga—literally ‘creation’.
9 The reading of this sentence in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (according to the critical edition of
Harimoto—see Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (3)):
sarggādiṣv api vācyavācakaśaktyapekṣaḥ saṁketaḥ kriyate /
And (api) convention (saṁketa), dependent on the denotative power (śakti) of the expressing
[word] (vācaka) in respect of the [object] expressed [by it] (vācya), is assumed (kriyate) at the
beginnings of the cycles of existence of the world (sarga).
10 vācya īśvaraḥ / kim asya saṁketakṛtaṁ vācakatvam atha pradīpaprakāśavat sthitam iti / sthito’sya
vācyasya vācakena saṁbandhaḥ / saṁketas tu tam evārthaṁ jvalayati / yathā sthitaḥ pitāputrayoḥ
saṁbandhaḥ saṁketena dyotyate ayam asya pitā ayam asya putraḥ iti / sargāntareṣv api vācyavācakaśak-
tyapekṣas tathaiva saṁketaḥ kriyate / saṁpratipattinityatayā nityaḥ śabdārthasaṁbandhaḥ ity āgaminaḥ
pratijānate // (The text of the YBh according to the critical edition of Maas. In this article the basic
version of the passages from the first chapter of the YS and YBh is always given according to the critical
edition of Maas.).
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consensus (saṁpratipatti) of the users of language concerning word meanings is
eternal, that is, having neither beginning nor end.
Yoga, unlike Mı¯ma¯m˙sa¯ and like the Grammarians (which hold, as Yoga
presented in the YBh, that the relation between word and its meaning is eternal and
not created by any person), accepts the conception of periodic dissolutions of the
world (pralaya). In the context of Yoga this eternal (permanent) character of the
relation between word and its meaning probably should be understood not as an
actual eternal existence, but as an actual existence from the beginning of creation to
the pralaya and reappearance from prakṛti at the beginning of a new creation, taking
place after the pralaya, during which word together with its denotative power
relating word to its meaning subsists in prakṛti in a potential state. After each
pralaya the saṁketa, that is, the agreement of the users of language concerning the
meanings of words, which is the same in all creations, is somehow made known to
the users of the language of the new cycle of existence of the world, and they
continue the agreement. Possibly it is I¯s´vara who communicates the saṁketa after
the pralaya to the future users of language. If we consider the reading of the Vulgata
(given in the footnote 7), we can interpret the text as speaking about ‘the convention
of I¯s´vara’ (īśvarasya saṁketaḥ). This ‘convention of I¯s´vara’ is a communication by
I¯s´vara of the beginningless linguistic convention. Unlike in Nya¯ya and Vais´es
˙
ika,
I¯s´vara is not an author of the content of the linguistic convention; he only makes
known the convention concerning the relation between words and their meanings to
the future users of language.
In YBh I, 27 the term saṁketa is used in 3 meanings: (1) in the sense it has in the
philosophy of language of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas11 (in the YBh it appears in
this sense in the question of the opponent); (2) in the meaning of the tradition of the
usage of words (this is the main meaning of the term saṁketa in the YBh); (3) in the
sense of transmitting (communicating, delivering, revealing, making known) the
tradition of the usage of words. The English word ‘convention’ can mean both a
newly established agreement and an agreement, consensus as a tradition, established
custom, or established practice.12 Thus the English word ‘convention’ fits both the
meaning (1) and meaning (2) mentioned above. For this reason the term saṁketa can
11 Their understanding of convention is explained in the beginning of this article.
12 As to the Sanskrit word saṁketa, I agree with Houben (1992, p. 231) who says that in the dictionaries
“there is no explicit mention of ‘convention as an established custom’”, for I have never encountered this
meaning. These are some of the meanings of the word saṁketa according to the Sanskrit-English
dictionary of Monier-Williams (1995): ‘agreement’, ‘compact’, ‘stipulation’, ‘assignation with’,
‘engagement’, ‘appointment’; ‘convention’, ‘consent’; ‘intimation’, ‘hint’, ‘allusion’. I would like to
draw attention to the word saṁketita, which is the cognate word of saṁketa. The main meanings of the
word saṁketita given in the dictionary of Monier-Williams: ‘agreed upon’, ‘fixed’, ‘settled’. The
meanings of this word are worth attention, for the author of the YBh understands saṁketa as fixed or
settled tradition, practice, or custom. The word samaya, which has the similar meanings with the word
saṁketa when it functions as the term of the philosophy of language, is used in the sense of ‘established
custom’ too, covering thus both meanings of the English word ‘convention’ mentioned above. Some of
the meanings of the word samaya according to the dictionary of Monier-Williams: ‘coming together’,
‘meeting or a place of meeting’; ‘coming to a mutual understanding’, ‘agreement’, ‘compact’, ‘covenant’,
‘treaty’, ‘contract’, ‘arrangement’, ‘engagement’, ‘stipulation’, ‘conditions of agreement’, ‘terms’;
‘convention’, ‘conventional rule or usage’, ‘established custom’, ‘law’, ‘rule’, ‘practice’, ‘observance’;
‘order’, ‘direction’, ‘precept’, ‘doctrine’; ‘sign’, ‘hint’, ‘indication’. About the dictionary meanings of the
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be translated as ‘convention’ also in those cases when it means tradition (established
custom, established practice) of the usage of words, though when we translate this
term as ‘convention’, a special explanation of its meaning should be given for the
reader. Besides this suitability of the English word ‘convention’ for translating the
term saṁketa in the context of the YBh too, I have also another reason for rendering
it as ‘convention’ in the context of this commentary. I think it is possible that the
Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s choice of the term saṁketa, which means agreement, is deliberate, not
adventitious. The reason why I think so I shall present below.
It is not clear from the majority of the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s commentary whether he
speaks about the relation between the syllable oṁ and its referent (I¯s´vara) or
whether he speaks about the relation between word and meaning in general, but
from the last sentence it follows that the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra keeps in mind both the relation
between the syllable oṁ and I¯s´vara and the relation between word and meaning in
general. Other passages of the YBh too (these passages will be analyzed below)
confirm that in the commentary to YS I, 27 cited above the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra presents his
view on the relation between word and meaning in general, and not only on the
relation between the syllable oṁ and I¯s´vara.
It is worth noting that the meanings of the term saṁketa in the YBh are similar to
its meanings in the philosophy of the Grammarians. Houben undertook a careful
analysis of the meaning of the terms samaya and saṁketa in the Vākyapadīya of
Bhartr
˙
hari (between 450 and 510 CE) and of the meaning of the term saṁketa in
Hela¯ra¯ja’s (about 980 CE)13 commentary on it; Houben shows that these
Grammarians understood samaya/saṁketa in a different way than the Vais´es
˙
ikas
and Naiya¯yikas. I shall cite the main results of Houben’s analysis. Houben (1992,
p. 238) writes: “… the following meanings of saṁketa may be distinguished in
Hela¯ra¯ja’s commentary: (1) a well established custom with regard to the relation
between word and meaning (Bhartr
˙
hari’s samaya in the Vākyapadīya 3.3.31 cd);
(2) convention as the creation of an entirely new relation (the Vais´es
˙
ikas’
convention, not accepted as an important factor in language); (3) reproduction or
transmission of an already given relation.” The main meaning of this term in
Hela¯ra¯ja’s commentary is meaning (1). Houben (1992, p. 224) writes that
commenting on Vākyapadīya 3.3.31 cd, Hela¯ra¯ja explains Bhartr
˙
hari’s samaya,
which corresponds to Hela¯ra¯ja’s saṁketa, in the following way: vṛddha-vyavahāra-
paraṁparā “the tradition of the verbal usage of the elders”. Meanings (1) and (3)
cover understanding of the saṁketa by Hela¯ra¯ja himself. In the Vākyapadīya of
Bhartr
˙
hari in most cases the term samaya is used instead of Hela¯ra¯ja’s saṁketa. As
it follows from Houben’s analysis, Bhartr
˙
hari’s usages of the term samaya
correspond to meanings (1) and (2) of the term saṁketa in Hela¯ra¯ja’s commentary.
Houben (1992, p. 236) says that the term saṁketa occurs only once in
Bhartr
˙
hari’s Vākyapadīya—in the meaning (1). Meaning (1) reflects Bhartr
˙
hari’s
own understanding of samaya/saṁketa. The first and main meaning of the
Footnote 12 continued
words saṁketa and samaya see also Houben (1992, pp. 221–222, 231–232). When the words samaya and
saṁketa function as terms of the philosophy of language, they have similar meanings.
13 The dates of Bhartr
˙
hari and Hela¯ra¯ja are given according to Coward and Raja (2001, pp. 121, 193).
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Grammarians’ saṁketa/samaya (see meanings listed by Houben) corresponds to the
second and main meaning of the term saṁketa in the YBh (see meanings listed by
me above), the third meaning of the Grammarians’ saṁketa corresponds to the third
meaning of this term in the YBh (these two meanings reflect Grammarians’ and
YBh’s understanding of linguistic convention), and the second meaning of the term
saṁketa/samaya in the texts of the Grammarians corresponds to the first meaning of
the term saṁketa in the YBh (this meaning reflects understanding of linguistic
convention by the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas).
In the light of our comparison of the notion of saṁketa in the YBh and the texts
of the Grammarians, Coward’s main thesis about “Patan˜jali’s Yoga contribution to
Bhartr
˙
hari” (2002, p. IX), defended by him in Part I of his book “Yoga and
psychology: language, memory, and mysticism” (2002, pp. 11–50), seems worth
special attention. It is possible to draw parallels not only between the notions of
linguistic convention in the YBh and in the Vākyapadīya, but also between other
notions and ideas of the philosophy of language appearing in these texts. For
example, according to both these texts: erroneous superimposition of one over the
other (identification) of word and its meaning takes place in ordinary language
usage14 (see Coward 1997, p. 117, 2002, p. 33; Houben 1992, pp. 235–236, 1997,
pp. 113–115); the smallest meaningful unit is a sentence (in the YBh the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra
implies this in his commentary to YS III, 17) (see Coward 2002, p. 33); a word is an
indivisible unity which has a mental nature (this idea is expressed by the author of
the YBh in his commentary to YS III, 17, though he does not use the term sphoṭa,
and his concept of word may be different from the concept of Bhartr
˙
hari). Even





3, 31) statements that the relation between word and meaning is made known due to
‘convention’—as the relation between parent and son (the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra speaks about
the relation between father and son, Bhartr
˙
hari—about the relation between mother
and son15; the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra uses the term saṁketa, Bhartr
˙
hari—samaya) (see Houben
1992, pp. 223, 225). However, it seems to me that at this stage of inquiry into the
Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga philosophy of language it is not possible to state with certainty
whether Bhartr
˙





yaka¯ra were influenced by the Mahābhāṣya (II century BC)16 of
Patan˜jali the Grammarian (both Bhartr
˙
hari and the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra17 could consider
themselves continuators of his thought).
14 In YS and YBh III, 17 it is said about erroneous identification of word, meaning, and mental idea.
15 Houben (1992, p. 223) comments upon this example: ‘‘If there is any relation that is a good example
of a relation not created by convention, then it is the relation between mother and child”.
16 The date of the Mahābhāṣya is given according to Raja (Coward and Raja 2001, p. 115).
17 Sūtra I, 1 of the YS and the beginning of the YBh commentary to this sūtra imitate the opening of the
Mahābhāṣya. It can be an evidence that the authors/author of the YS and YBh were/was influenced by the
Mahābhāṣya. However, scholars express uncertainty about the validity of the transmission of the
Mahābhāṣya in the existing editions of this text and the need for a new critical edition of theMahābhāṣya.
See, for example, the critical edition of the first chapter of the YS and YBh prepared by Maas, p. 89, note
1.2, and Harimoto (2014, p. 194, footnote 366).
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Let us proceed to considering other usages of the term saṁketa in the YBh. The
following passage of the YBh III, 17 confirms what we said above about the main
meaning of this term in the YBh:
And the convention (saṁketa), having the form of a mutual superimposition
(itaretarādhyāsarūpa) of word (pada) and word meaning (padārtha) [i.e., the
object to which the word refers], is in its essence what has been handed down
by memory [of the users of language] (smṛtyātmaka).18 “This object (artha) is
the same as this word (sabda), [and] this word (śabda) is the same as this
object (artha)”—thus the convention (saṁketa) takes the form of mutual
superimposition (itaretarādhyāsarūpa) [of word and object]. In the same way
these [three]—word (śabda), object (artha), and idea (pratyaya)—get
confused because of [their] mutual superimposition (itaretarādhyāsa), [for
example,] the word (śabda) ‘cow’, the object (artha) ‘cow’, and the notion
(jñāna) ‘cow’. He who knows the distinction between them is all-knowing.19
The most important confirmation of what has been said above about saṁketa of the
YBh is that saṁketa is understood by its author as smṛti—‘the tradition’, or ‘what
has been handed down by memory’. In fact, the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra defines here the
linguistic convention of using words for their appropriate objects as the tradition of
the usage of words, that is, the usage of words which has been handed down by the
memory of generations of users of language.
This passage is a part of the commentary to the following sūtra of the YS:
śabdārthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt saṃkaras tatpravibhāgasaṁyamāt sarv-
abhūtarutajñānam // (“Confusion of word (śabda), [its] meaning [i.e., the object
denoted by it] (artha), and the idea (pratyaya) [occurs] because of [their] mutual
superimposition (itaretarādhyāsa). By saṁyama on the distinction between them
knowledge of [the meaning] of cries of all beings [is attained].”) Feuerstein (1996,
p. 119) gives a lucid interpretation of this sūtra: “As I understand it, this simply
means that by nature śabda, artha and pratyaya are experienced as one. A sound
uttered by a living being is always the bearer of meaning. It is also accompanied by
an image in the mind of the percipient. If the sound is unknown, it can be
understood by directly perceiving the idea in the mind of the sender. To achieve this
direct perception or sākṣātkāra of the idea in the sender’s consciousness, the yogin
must make the distinction between word, meaning and image the subject of his
meditative absorption and enstasy.” In his commentary to this sūtra the author of the
YBh, first, presents the Yoga philosophy of language (mainly the conception of
word), second, emphasizes the distinct nature of word, meaning (that is, the object
which the word refers to), and mental idea. It follows from the YBh that the relation
between word and meaning, though permanent (having neither beginning nor end),
is not inseparable. Object is not related inseparably to word; object exists and can be
cognized independently of word which denotes it.
18 It can be also translated as: “…; is in its essence the tradition (smṛti) [of the usage of words].”
19 saṁketas tu padapadārthayor itaretarādhyāsarūpaḥ smṛtyātmakaḥ / yo’yaṁ śabdaḥ so’yam artho
yo’yam arthaḥ so’yaṁ śabda ity evam itaretarādhyāsarūpaḥ saṁketo bhavatīti / evam ete śabdārtha-
pratyayā itaretarādhyāsāt saṅkīrṇāḥ gaur iti śabdo gaur ity artho gaur iti jñānam / ya eṣāṁ
pravibhāgajñaḥ sa sarvavit / .
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In YBh III, 17 the word saṁketa appears 6 times (separately or as a part of a
compound). 2 occurrences of this word are in the passage cited above. One of these
2 usages, as it was mentioned above, confirms the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s understanding of
saṁketa presented in YBh I, 27. The other of these 2 usages, as well as 4 usages not
cited here, are not in conflict with this understanding; saṁketa can be interpreted in
all these 5 cases as ‘tradition of the usage of words’ or ‘established (practice/custom
of the) usage of words’. In these 5 cases saṁketa is regarded as something due to
which or in which word and object (or word, object, and idea) are related to each
other or mutually superimposed upon each other. The Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra says that it is
because of the convention (saṁketa), which has neither beginning nor end, a fixed
sequence of sounds is comprehended by mind as an indivisible unity (i.e., word)
related to the certain object as its meaning. It is clear from the context of YBh III, 17
that the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra does not accept the primary linguistic convention established
deliberately by I¯s´vara or some other person(s) (the conception of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and
Naiya¯yikas), for he says that the mind of the ordinary man (loka-buddhi) is
“penetrated with the impressions of the usage of language which has(ve) no
beginning” (anādi-vāg-vyavahāra-vāsana-anuviddha). According to the Bha¯s
˙
ya-
ka¯ra, language (or the usage of language, or the impressions left by the usage of
language—depending on our interpretation of the Sanskrit compound) has(ve) no
beginning, therefore, saṁketa is understood by him as the tradition of the usage of
words which has no beginning, and not as a deliberate act of establishing the
relation between word and meaning unrelated before this act. According to the
Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, the agreement concerning meanings of words has
beginning (the primary agreement is established at the beginning of each new
creation, though it is the same in all the creations), but according to the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra,
language and saṁketa have no beginning. YBh’s saṁketa is different from the
saṁketa of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas.
Two more usages of the word saṁketa (as a part of the compound śabda-
saṁketa) we find in YBh I, 42 and I, 43 (1 time this word occurs in YS I, 42 and 1
time in YS I, 43). Sūtras I, 42 and I, 43 of the YS are devoted to the savitarkā
samāpatti and nirvitarkā samāpatti respectively. In YS I, 42 it is said that savitarkā
samāpatti is ‘confused’ (saṁkīrṇā) because of the ‘mental construct of word,
meaning, and knowledge’ (śabda-artha-jñāna-vikalpa). The author of the YS by
‘mental construct of word, meaning, and knowledge’ understands the false
identification of the word, the object to which the word refers, and the mental
idea/notion of this object—compare YS III, 17 (cited above) about the false
identification of word (śabda), the object it refers to (artha), and the mental idea
(pratyaya). In the next sūtra I, 43 it is said that in the nirvitarkā samāpatti, which
takes place ‘when the memory is purified’ (smṛti-pariśuddhau), the mind is ‘as it
were devoid of its own nature’ (svarūpa-śūnyā iva)—this state is characterized as
‘that in which the object only is manifested’ (artha-mātra-nirbhāsā). The author of
the YBh, commenting on these sūtras, says that in order to pass from the state of
savitarkā samāpatti, in which word (śabda), its object (artha), and the mental idea/
notion (jñāna) are not distinguished from one another, to the higher state of
nirvitarkā samāpatti, in which mind takes the form of the object, manifesting it as it
is, without confusing it with the notion (mental idea, concept) of this object and the
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word denoting it, the memory is to be purified from śabda-saṁketa. In this context
śabda-saṁketa is understood by the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra as that from which memory is to be
purified in order to reach the higher level of the yogic path, that is, the nirvitarkā
samāpatti. Śabda-saṁketa, or ‘word convention(s)’, can be interpreted there as
‘established usage(s) of words’ stored in our memory.
There is one more usage of the word saṁketa in the YBh. It occurs in YBh I, 49,
in the commentary to the following sūtra: śrutānumānābhyām anyaviṣayā
viśeṣārthavattvāt // (“[The wisdom (prajñā) attained in the state of nir-
vicārāsamāpatti] has an object different from [an object] of the authoritative
verbal testimony (śruta) and inference (anumāna), for it has the individual (viśeṣa)
as its object.”)20 In the beginning of the commentary to this sūtra the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra
says that authoritative verbal testimony has the universal (sāmānya) only as its
object,21 and the individual (viśeṣa) cannot be expressed by it. He explains it in the
following way: na hi viśeṣeṇa kṛtasaṁketaḥ śabdaḥ / 22 The sentence is difficult to
interpret. Literally it can be translated: “For it is not [so] that word has convention
(saṁketa) by/with/through/because of the individual.” It can be interpreted: “For it
is not so that word has established usage (saṁketa) based on the individual.” In the
YBh the beginningless saṁketa is understood as that due to which word and object
are related to each other (see above our analysis of the meaning of the word saṁketa
in YBh III, 17). In this passage of the YBh the term saṁketa has the similar
connotation. The Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra says that word does not express the individual, for
by/due to the convention (established usage, tradition of its usage) word is related
not to the individual, but to the universal.
20 This is the basic reading of the critical edition of Maas. The reading supported by most of the
manuscripts (see the critical edition of Maas, p. 81):
śrutānumānaprajñābhyām anyaviṣayā viśeṣārthatvāt //
[The wisdom (prajñā) attained in the state of nirvicārāsamāpatti] has an object different from [an
object] of the verbal and inferential wisdom (prajñā), for its object is the individual (viśeṣa).
The reading of the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (according to the reconstruction of the text of the YS
and YBh contained in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa prepared by Maas in collaboration with Harimoto
—see Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (4), p. 162):
sā punaḥ śrutānumānaprajñābhyām anyaviṣayā //
But it [that is, the wisdom (prajñā) attained in the state of nirvicārāsamāpatti,] has an object
different from [an object] of the verbal and inferential wisdom (prajñā).
21 Cf. YBh I, 25, where the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra says that the individual property/the individual (viśeṣa) can be
known through the authoritative verbal testimony, and not through the inference by which the universal
(sāmānya) only can be known. This inconsequence in the text of the YBh is noted by Maas (2010,
pp. 389–390).
22 It is worth noting that the beginning of YBh I, 49 contained in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa differs
from the basic reconstruction of this passage in the critical edition. According to the Pātañjalayogaśāstra-
vivaraṇa, YBh I, 49 begins as follows (see Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (4), p. 162):
viśeṣo na saṁketayituṁ śakyate/sāmānyena hi kṛtasaṁketaḥ śabdo na viśeṣam abhidhātuṁ śaknoti /
The individual cannot be related by convention (na saṁketayituṁ śakyate) [to the word], for word
has convention (saṁketa) by/with/through/because of the universal, [and] it is not able to express
the individual.
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After considering the usages of the term saṁketa occurring in the YBh I would like
to explainwhy I often translate it as ‘convention’ in the context of this commentary. As
I mentioned above, the English word ‘convention’ can mean also an agreement,
consensus as a tradition, established custom, or established usage, fitting therefore for
expressing the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s understanding of saṁketa. Why not translate saṁketa as
‘tradition of the usage of words’ or ‘established (practice/custom of the) usage of
words’, avoiding thus an ambiguity of the English word ‘convention’ (which means
also a newly established agreement)? In my opinion, it is very possible that the
Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s choice of theword saṁketa, whichmeans agreement, was deliberate. As
it follows from YS and YBh I, 42–43 and III, 17 (see our analysis above), word and its
meaning (the object denoted by it) have a distinct nature; an object (artha) is not
related inseparably to the word (śabda) which denotes it—an object exists and can be
cognized independently of the word. The Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra says that in order to cognize the
object as it is mind is to be purified from śabda-saṁketa—‘word convention(s)’, or the
‘established usage(s) of words’ stored in our memory.23
It looks like YBh’s view on the relation between word and its meaning is different
from the view ofMı¯ma¯m˙sa¯. According toMīmāṁsāsūtra and Śābarabhāṣya I, 1, 5, the
relation betweenword and itsmeaning is autpattika (‘original’, ‘primordial’, ‘natural’,
‘existential’). S´abara explains: the relation between word and meaning is autpattika,
for it has its root in their utpatti (‘origin’), and the utpatti is interpreted by him as bhāva
(‘existing’, ‘being’, or ‘nature’). S´abara says that this relation is inseparable (aviyukta)
(see Śābarabhāṣya I, 1, 5). Both S´abara and the author of the YBh hold that this
relation is nitya (‘permanent’, ‘eternal’) (the main term used by the author of the YBh
is sthita, but he also refers to scriptural authorities who characterize the relation as
nitya), it has neither beginning nor end, but the nature of the relation is understood by
them differently. For the author of the YBh, unlike for S´abara, the relation between
word and meaning is not rooted in their nature and not inseparable.
It is very probable that by using the word saṁketa the author of the YBh wanted
to emphasize that the relation the object has with the word denoting it does not
belong to the nature of the object, but depends on agreement, i.e., consensus of the
users of language. This consensus is eternal, but it is still a consensus. By stating the
eternal character of the relation between word and its meaning, the author of the
YBh probably wants to say that he does not believe in the linguistic convention as
an act of establishing the relation between words and meanings primarily unrelated,
understood as an act of creation of language and giving it to the future users of
language which accept this gift (it is the linguistic convention of the Vais´es
˙
ikas and
Naiya¯yikas);24 and by stating the conventional character of this relation, the author
23 An excellent analysis of the YS and YBh passages about the mutual superimposition of word, its
object, and the mental idea and the yogic practice of realizing distinctions between them and purifying the
mind of concepts and word convention(s) is presented in the book of Jakubczak (2013, pp. 89–96, 144–
147). In the context of her analysis the scholar points out “arbitrariness and relativity of all word
conventions” according to classical Yoga (2013, p. 96).
24 See arguments against this conception of linguistic convention as an absolute beginning of language
presented by Mı¯ma¯m˙sa¯ (see Śābarabhāṣya I, 1, 5; Arnold 2006, pp. 458–476), the Grammarians (see
Houben 1992, p. 233), and modern philosophers of language (see Arnold 2006, pp. 445–476). The main
argument is lucidly summarized by Murti (1997, pp. IX–X): “Convention itself presupposes language,
which is sought to be derived from convention. To make convention, words have to be used and
14 O. Łucyszyna
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of the YBh probably wants to emphasize the fact that this relation, though having
neither beginning nor end, nevertheless exists due to the agreement, or the
consensus of the users of language (if this relation were not conventional, but rooted
in the nature of the denoted object, then the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s instruction of purification
of mind of the śabda-saṁketa in order to cognize the object as it is had no sense).
The relation between word and its meaning, though eternal, is not necessary, not
rooted in their nature, and not inseparable.25 If we translate the term saṁketa as
‘tradition of the usage of words’ or ‘established (practice/custom of the) usage of
words’, and not as ‘(linguistic) convention’, this term can lose its important
connotation indicating that common agreement or consensus (general consensus of
the users of language concerning the meanings of words), and not a nature of word
and the object denoted by it forms the basis of the relation between them.26 For this
reason I accept ‘convention’ as the translation of the term saṁketa in the context of
Footnote 24 continued
understood by persons participating in the convention. This is clearly circular. Invoking God does not
help here. How could God make known his intentions, his conventions between particular words and their
specific meanings, to persons who did not use language already; there would be a communication-gap.
And if men were already using language, God’s convention does not obviously initiate language as
claimed. However far back we might push the beginning of convention, we would still find language use
preceding it. An absolute beginning of language is untenable. Linguistic usage is continuous.”
25 It is worth noting that the Yoga view on the relation between word and meaning in some important
aspects can be compared with the theory of linguistic sign of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), though
we should remember that Saussure’s conception of word meaning is different from its understanding in
the YBh (this difference is expressed in the following citation from Saussure’s famous “Course in general
linguistics”: “The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image” (2011,
p. 66)). According to Saussure, a linguistic sign is arbitrary in the sense that there is no natural relation
between ‘the signifier’ and ‘the signified’, i.e., the acoustic pattern and the concept (meaning), but this
relation is based on the convention, or agreement of the users of language. Linguistic signs are
conventional, but language is not an agreement [not “a contract pure and simple” (Saussure 2011, p. 71)]
which can be established or deliberately changed by somebody. The members of the linguistic community
accept and transmit the language convention, but no person or group of persons is able to establish or
change it according to its will. In this sense the linguistic sign is immutable. Language is a fixed tradition
inherited from preceding generations and accepted by a community (Saussure 2011, pp. 65–78). It looks
like these ideas of the famous Swiss linguist are strikingly similar to the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra’s view on the
relation between word and its meaning. Unlike for the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra, who says that the linguistic
convention is the same in all the creations, for Saussure a linguistic sign is historically changeable.
Language changes in spite of the inability of the users of language to change it deliberately (Saussure
2011, pp. 74–78).
26 The following passage from YBh I, 27 can seem to contradict my interpretation of the relation between
word and meaning (this passage is analyzed above): “The relation of this [object] expressed [by the word]
(vācya) to the [word] expressing [it] (vācaka) is permanent (sthita). However (tu), convention (saṁketa)
illuminates (jvalayati) that very (eva) meaning (artha)—as the relation between father and son [which is]
permanent (sthita) is made known (dyotyate) by convention (saṁketa): ‘This is his father’, ‘This is his
son’.” In my opinion, this contradiction is only apparent, not real: the Bha¯s
˙
yaka¯ra does not suggest that
the relation between word and its meaning is natural as the relation between father and son; the relation
between father and son functions in the YBh as an example of the relation which is not created by
convention, but only made known by it—it is in this sense only that the relation between father and its son
is similar to the relation between word and its meaning. Cf. Houben’s comment cited by me in footnote
15.
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the YBh—until future studies of Pa¯tan˜jala Yoga philosophy of language make my
interpretation more precise.27
The conclusion of my analysis of the meaning of the term saṁketa in the YBh is
that YBh’s understanding of linguistic convention is different from its understand-
ing by the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas and similar to its understanding by the
Grammarians, that is, by Bhartr
˙
hari and his commentator Hela¯ra¯ja (as presented in
Houben’s article “Bhartr
˙
hari’s samaya/Hela¯ra¯ja’s saṁketa. A contribution to the
reconstruction of the Grammarian’s discussion with the Vais´es
˙
ikas on the relation
between śabda and artha”, published in the “Journal of Indian Philosophy”). YBh’s
saṁketa, which I translate preliminarily as ‘(linguistic) convention’, is not an
agreement established by some person/persons, as the samaya/saṁketa of the
Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, but an agreement in the sense of tradition, established
practice, or established custom. The following interpretations of the term saṁketa
reflect YBh’s understanding of the linguistic convention: the tradition of the usage
of words, established (practice/custom of the) usage of words. YBh’s saṁketa, the
same in all the creations, handed down by memory of the generations of users of
language, has neither beginning nor end. This saṁketa, unlike saṁketa/samaya of
the Vais´es
˙
ikas and Naiya¯yikas, is not re-created (re-established), but only made
known (revealed) at the beginning of each cycle of existence of the world.
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